0 0 1 8 -9 1 6 2 / 1 7/ $ 3 3 . 0 0 © 2 0 1 7 I E E E RESEARCH FEATURE O rganizations employ various policies to support effective and secure service delivery. These policies are explicit, inspectable, and readily updatable, but creating and maintaining them is a nontrivial task: errors made by system administrators during configuration frequently cause service provisioning failures and introduce security vulnerabilities.
Specifically, defining and maintaining policies correctly is nontrivial because correctness depends on conflicting and changing stakeholder requirements. Current methods for correctly defining and maintaining policies capture those policies in a haphazard manner by creating and reordering policy lists. Previous approaches used analysis to identify anomalies and conflicts. 3, 4 In contrast, Aragorn uses the underlying stakeholder requirements to guide system administrators in initial policy creation. Doing so helps capture administrators' tacit knowledge and facilitates maintenance.
THE ARAGORN APPROACH
Aragorn is a general-purpose method for policy creation and maintenance based on argumentation, which is a systematic way of drawing conclusions using logical reasoning. Essentially, it incorporates domain-specific argumentation schemes and provides an evidential basis for balancing competing concerns that might reflect (sometimes inconsistent) stakeholder requirements. Aragorn models each policy specification as a decision and represents arguments for and against that specification. This network of arguments captures each policy's design rationale, highlighting dependencies and conflicts among multiple policies. The arguments provide guidance by determining which policies to drop, insert, or modify in light of stakeholder requirement changes. Aragorn comprises two main parts: an evidence-based framework that identifies actions, such as policy activation or deactivation, and a methodology that guides the development of the most defensible security policies, given the premises and arguments. Successful argumentation relies on applying schemes to identify the critical questions that an argument can raise. Aragorn incorporates argumentation schemes geared toward service security policies, providing a simple approach to 
THE FIREWALL AS AN EXEMPLAR DOMAIN
Firewalls and firewall policies form the first line of defense against attacks and unauthorized traffic, and thus are vital to an enterprise's security infrastructure. However, dynamically emerging threats and requirements force system administrators to continuously refine their firewall policies. In any firewall security policy, the lack of efficient analysis mechanisms and tools can result in policy errors-for instance, Avishai Wool found that despite significant effort by enterprises, firewalls are frequently configured incorrectly. 2 The complexity and challenges involved in defining and maintaining firewall policies therefore makes firewalls an appropriate choice as an exemplar domain of application for Aragorn. A firewall controls information flow to and from a computer network. A firewall policy is an ordered set of rules, 4 with each rule specifying whether an incoming or outgoing packet is allowed or blocked, depending on its protocol, source IP, source port, destination IP, and destination port. Given a packet, the firewall considers rules in sequence and takes the action specified by the first rule that applies. If the action is not desired, the result might be a breach, so correct rule order is crucial. Table 1 shows a partial firewall policy and its requirements (R) and facts (F).
Defining and maintaining a firewall policy involves complex decision making because the potential for conflicts among policies can result in anomalies. 3 A rule L generalizes over a rule M, and provided L has a higher priority than M, every packet that satisfies L also satisfies M, even though both rules specify different actionsfor example, in Table 1 , rule 12 generalizes over rule 9. 4 Additional firewall anomalies include shadowing, correlation, and redundancy. 3 Some firewall rules are never executed because of these anomalies. Firewall policy anomalies can result in legitimate packets being blocked and unwanted packets being allowed, requiring an administrator to resolve them. However, detecting and resolving anomalies is tedious and error-prone. Common errors include failing to validate key assumptions, omitting important evidence, overlooking connections across available evidence, and improperly prioritizing conflicting evidence and justifications.
ARGUMENTATION AND ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES
An argument consists of three parts-a conclusion, a set of premises, and an inference from the premises to the conclusion. 5 Argumentation involves constructing a network of arguments in which the conclusion of one is a premise to another. Arguments can be supported or attacked by other arguments and can undermine (contradict the premises of) or rebut (contradict the conclusions of) another. Formal argumentation theory models arguments as first-class entities. An argumentation scheme is a construction pattern 6 that represents an argument's inference structure and provides critical questions for evaluating whether it holds. These questions capture the critical thinking needed to engage in an argument. Decision makers raise such questions to find arguments that support or attack other arguments by following an argumentation scheme that will iteratively collect evidence and infer the veracity of its conclusion until a decision can be made (whether to accept or reject the conclusion). We can write an argumentation scheme as <premise, conclusions, questions>. 
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The practical reasoning argumentation scheme provides a template for a situation in which a decision maker asserts that action A should be carried out because A is a means to realize requirement R. 6 We write this scheme as
› premise (minor) h 2 : action A is a means to realize R; and › Are other actions, in addition to A, required to bring about R?
These questions help identify supporting and conflicting requirements and alternatives and offer an efficient means to realizing a requirement. We can also adopt additional argumentation schemes, such as arguments by consequence, arguments from alternatives, and arguments from opposites to answer these questions.
ARAGORN: EVIDENCE-BASED ARGUMENTATION
The decision maker's knowledgebase consists of premises and inference rules that are supported or opposed by available evidence, with each piece of evidence associated with a belief measure based on the evidence that supports or opposes it. The decision maker applies argumentation schemes to construct an argument and calculates the belief measure of its conclusion by combining the belief measures.
We can adapt a probability-certainty representation of belief, 7 where the probability represents the likelihood that the conclusion is true given the evidence, and the certainty measures the amount of nonconflicting evidence. A sufficiently high certainty indicates the argument's completeness of the argument: 
DEFINING POLICIES VIA ARAGORN
In addition to using general argumentation schemes, 6 Aragorn also uses domain-specific schemes (such as the firewall argumentation scheme), associated critical questions, and related evidence to synthesize arguments. Table 1 lists the requirements underlying a firewall policy-for instance, Example Inc. needs to enable file transfer, and it is a known fact that FTP and SFTP do that. To construct arguments for these requirements and premises, we adopt the practical-reasoning argumentation scheme introduced earlier, based on the file transfer requirement and the fact that FTP should be enabled. Furthermore, on answering the critical questions associated with the scheme, we find that FTP needs port 20. By iteratively applying the scheme, we conclude that we need to allow port 20 to support file transfer. We can express a useful firewallspecific scheme as We could potentially construct arguments (employing additional argumentation schemes) whose conclusions are the above-mentioned premises, for example, to determine whether a destination is vulnerable.
Constructing arguments

Associating evidence and belief measure
Consider the file transfer requirement in Table 1 and the scenario in which the administrator needs to determine if file transfer from the source locA .example.com should be allowed. By the argument in practical reasoning, we see that FTP is a means to file transfer, so we can conclude that to enable file transfer via FTP, packets to port 20 should be allowed. Also, using a similar argument for SFTP, we see that SFTP is a means for file transfer, so we can conclude that to enable file transfer via SFTP, packets to port 22 should be allowed. Next, as described earlier, we can apply the firewall scheme and associate the evidence listed in Figure 1c to determine if packets with destinations of ports 20 and 22 should be allowed.
Considering the pieces of evidence and their belief measures in Figure  1c , we can calculate the belief measure for the conclusions of arguments A1 "allow packets to port 20" and A2 "allow packets to port 22" as follows. Starting with A1, : : Figure 1 shows the belief measure calculation for arguments A1 and A2 to determine whether packets being sent to ports 20 and 22 should be allowed. We can see that argument A1 yields a belief with a high uncertainty value, whereas A2 yields high belief with reasonable uncertainty. Therefore, the administrator can allow packets to port 22.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We empirically evaluated the comparative effectiveness of Aragorn and the traditional rule-based approach (henceforth Trad) by considering the following hypotheses: › H 1 . Aragorn yields policies of higher coverage than Trad yields. Null hypothesis: Aragorn has no effect on the coverage of the policies. › H 2 . Aragorn yields policies of greater correctness than Trad yields. Null hypothesis: Aragorn has no effect on the correctness of the policies.
› H 3 . Modelers expend less time
and effort in defining policies using Aragorn than those using Trad. Null hypothesis: Aragorn has no effect on the time and effort expended.
We conducted a human-subject study to evaluate these hypotheses. North
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Carolina State University's Institutional Review Board approved the study, and we collected informed consent from each participant in exchange for US$20.
Study design
We selected 24 computer science students (21 graduate and 3 undergraduate), each of whom had more than three years of programming and software development experience, and a familiarity with conceptual modeling, network security, and firewalls. Because network administration is a technology task performed by network engineers, our participants are acceptable surrogates for firewall administrators. Of the participants, 19 had academic or industry experience with network security and firewalls, and 16 had academic or industry experience with conceptual modeling. Our study included three phases and applied the one-factor approach with two alternatives (Trad and Aragorn):
› Phase 1, learn. Participants in each group learned the respective approach by specifying a firewall policy for a hypothetical academic scenario that had eight requirements to take into account when specifying a firewall policy.
› Phase 2, design. Each participant specified a firewall policy for a hypothetical enterprise scenario using the approach learned in Phase 1. The scenario had 12 requirements.
› Phase 3, maintain. We provided participants with an incomplete solution to the scenario in Phase 2 and asked them to modify their solution to accommodate five additional requirements.
We mitigated two main threats in our study. Specifically, to mitigate the threat of skill differences between participants, we surveyed 
FIGURE 1.
Example arguments and pieces of evidence: (a) argument A1, allow packets to port 20; (b) argument A2, allow packets to port 22; and (c) pieces of evidence corresponding to the file transfer requirement in Table 1 .
them on their educational backgrounds, prior experience with conceptual modeling and network security, and familiarity with defining and maintaining firewall policies and then balanced the groups based on the results. To mitigate the threat of participants failing to return surveys, we had them complete one after each phase, while the task was still fresh in their minds. We split the participants into two groups: the Trad group defined firewall packet-filtering rules based on the requirements and evidence described in the scenario, and the Aragorn group used argumentation schemes and critical questions to create an argumentation network consisting of multiple arguments (with premises and claims). Their goal was to associate evidence with arguments and assign a strength value (a decimal value between 0 and 1) based on their intuition.
Metrics
We analyzed the resulting artifacts to measure the following:
› Coverage. Ratio of the number of requirements satisfied to the total number of requirements in the design and maintenance phases (higher is better). 
› Effort. Product of time in minutes
to design the solution and difficulty in applying, defined as a subjective measure to account for both the actual time spent and the perceived difficulty to complete the task (lower is better).
› Effort/coverage ratio (effort divided by coverage). A subjective measure to compute effort required per unit coverage (lower is better).
These statistical measures address both quality and process: for quality, we measured coverage and correctness, which directly correlate with human errors, and for process, we measured time and difficulty. Effort and the effort/coverage ratio are hybrids of quality and process.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We evaluated the proposed hypotheses (H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 ) by using the metrics in the previous section, computed from the solutions that each participant designed. We applied the common t-test for means and Wilcoxon rank sum test to compare the difference in the medians (x); Wilcoxon is stricter than the t-test and does not assume normality. Table 2 lists the computed values.
We evaluated the coverage and correctness hypotheses (H 1 and H 2 ) by using the coverage, correctness, and quality measures. The mean coverage Figures 2a and 2b show the coverage and correctness boxplots based on the numbers of requirements satisfied in Phases 2 and 3. We evaluated the time and effort hypothesis (H 3 ) by using the learnability, maintainability, difficulty, and effort measures. The average time to learn the approaches and design the solution for the security settings in Phases 1 and 2 was lower for Aragorn (84 minutes) than for Trad (88.6 minutes). However, the time taken to modify an existing solution in Phase 3 was greater for Aragorn (29.5 minutes) than for Trad (20.08 minutes), thus the null hypothesis is not rejected. This result was not surprising because participants in the Aragorn group were required to meticulously answer each critical question in the argumentation scheme as they made changes to existing arguments. We can potentially overcome this challenge through improved tool support.
The median perceived difficulty to learn was found to be the same for the two groups, but difficulty in applying was higher for Aragorn. This can be attributed to the participants lacking prior experience of working with formal argumentation. Figures 2c and  2d show plots for difficulty perceived by the participants, with the p values indicating no significant difference in difficulty. Figure 2e shows the boxplot for effort expended by the participants, with those using Aragorn generally spending more effort on the task. However, as Figure 2f shows, the effort/ coverage ratio was lower for Aragorn (291.99) than for Trad (466.09). We do not include time and effort expended in Phase 1 when computing these parameters, and the p values do not indicate a significant difference in the associated effort/coverage measure. Although participants using Aragorn spent more time modifying an existing solution, we have found that it is not difficult to use, and the extra effort expended yields significant benefits in coverage.
O ur empirical evaluation of Aragorn indicates that it performs significantly better than the traditional approach in terms of coverage, correctness, and quality; it is on par with the traditional approach for learnability, difficulty, and effort/ coverage. Much as we expected, participants expended more time and effort when using Aragorn, but this is justified by the aggregated improvements in quality. Future improvements will focus on better tooling to reduce the time and effort required to reap the advantages of using Aragorn.
An important future direction is to automatically extract evidence supporting and opposing policy arguments from a security policy corpus. Another direction is to adapt existing context-aware requirements elicitation approaches to systematically define, maintain, and reason about contextual goals and plans.
RELATED WORK IN ARGUMENTATION AND SECURITY
R
elevant works combine argumentation and security requirements. Douglas Walton and colleagues 1 provided a foundation for general argumentation schemes, which several frameworks, models, and tools support. [2] [3] [4] However, their effectiveness has not been adequately empirically evaluated. Jamal Bentahar and colleagues' 5 argumentation-driven approach enables web services to negotiate and persuade peers to join communities, as well as reason about their commitments.
Virginia Franqueira and colleagues 6 model security requirements and assess risks associated via arguments. Similarly, Dan Ionita and colleagues 7 analyze risk by using an argumentation game. Their tabular representation of arguments appears no more usable or scalable than the traditional firewall representation. These works disregard uncertainty and incompleteness of information, and have not been empirically evaluated.
